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A Reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung
Caleb Liang
In what follows, I respond to Haug and Jung’s criticisms of my target paper and
defend the following claims: (1) the sense of experiential ownership can misrep-
resent the fact of experiential ownership; (2) the sense of experiential ownership
is eligible to serve as a bearer of IEM; (3) at least some versions of IEM face
genuine counterexamples; and (4) as far as the sense of self-as-subject is con-
cerned, IEM is not a trivial property. Finally, I describe a new set of experiments
that  induced  what  I  call  “the  self-touching  illusion.”  The  data,  I  suggest,
strengthen the view that both the sense of self-as-subject and IEM are open to
empirical as well as philosophical investigation.
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1 Introduction
Does the sense of self-as-subject conform to the
immunity principle (IEM)? When I experience a
phenomenal state, does it guarantee that based
on  first-personal  access  I  cannot  be  wrong
about whether it is me who experiences it? In
“Self-as-Subject and Experiential Ownership”, I
elucidated the sense of self-as-subject in terms
of the sense of experiential ownership, and ar-
gued that  the sense  of  experiential  ownership
does not enjoy IEM. Haug and Jung raise very
substantial issues against my overall  position.1
Here, I respond to Haug and Jung’s criticisms
and intend to show how an interdisciplinary ap-
proach may enhance our understanding of the
sense of self-as-subject.
Let me begin by suggesting that the fol-
lowing two issues regarding IEM are different:
1 I am very thankful for Haug and Jung’s criticisms, from which I have
learnt a great deal. Below I will use “the sense of self-as-subject” and
“the sense of experiential ownership” interchangeably. 
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(1) Does IEM correctly specify how we use the
first-person pronoun “I”? (2) Does IEM really
mark the line between the sense of self-as-object
and the sense of self-as-subject? While (1) con-
cerns a linguistic rule, (2) is about the nature of
self-consciousness.  The  issue  addressed  in  my
paper was (2).  I investigated the best way to
understand the distinction between the sense of
self-as-object and the sense of self-as-subject. I
argued that IEM, or at least some versions of it,
fails  to  draw the distinction between the two
types of self-consciousness. I proposed an altern-
ative account, according to which the distinc-
tion can be better articulated in terms of the
sense of body ownership and the sense of exper-
iential ownership.
2 Experiential ownership and the 
immunity principle
The first issue raised by Haug and Jung con-
cerns whether the sense of experiential owner-
ship could misrepresent the fact of experiential
ownership at all. For ease of discussion, I will
present my argument against IEM again, and
then reply to Haug and Jung’s objection. Here
is the argument: 
(1) For every phenomenal state there must be a
subject who experiences it. 
(2) Every phenomenal state is in principle avail-
able to first-personal access. 
(3) Every phenomenal state is  experienced by
the one  who has first-personal  access  to  that
state. 
However, (1)~(3) do not imply: 
(4) Every phenomenal state is, from the first-
person point of view, represented as experienced
by the one who has first-personal access to that
state (Liang this collection, p. 8).
Three  remarks  are  in  order:  first,  when
Haug and Jung characterize the fact of experi-
ential ownership as a conceptual truth or a mat-
ter of logical necessity, what they say can be ac-
commodated by (1) above. I agree with (1), but
that is not my notion of the fact of experiential
ownership. For me, the fact of experiential own-
ership is an  empirical fact: it is not just that
every phenomenal state has a subject; rather, it
concerns exactly who is the subject of a specific
experience  in  a  given  situation.  For  example,
right now, it is me, not you, who is experiencing
back pains. So, the fact of experiential owner-
ship is captured and fixed not by (1) but by (3)
in my argument above; i.e., the question “who
is  the  subject  of  that  particular  phenomenal
state?” can be answered by ascertaining which
particular  subject  has  first-personal  access  to
that state. Second, I would not characterize the
sense  of  experiential  ownership  as  concerning
“the content of a phenomenal state” (Haug &
Jung this collection, p. 5). As I stated in the
target paper (Liang this collection, pp. 6–7), the
representational  content  and  the  phenomenal
character of a phenomenal state belong to the
what-component of that state. The sense of ex-
periential  ownership  is  exclusively  about  the
who-component, which is captured by (4) in my
argument.  Third,  central  to  my  argument  is
that (3) and (4) are not equivalent: as in FB’s
case of somatoparaphrenia, feeling sensations is
one thing, but whether she experiences herself
as the subject of those sensations could be an-
other.  Misrepresentation  may  occur  in  one’s
sense  of  self-as-subject  when  there  is  a  mis-
match between (3) and (4), i.e., when the sense
of experiential  ownership fails  to pick out the
same subject as the one settled by (3). As I sug-
gested, the best way to describe FB’s case is
that, while the fact of her experiential owner-
ship is intact, her sense of experiential owner-
ship fails to represent that fact. Given these re-
marks, the first four premises of Haug & Jung’s
argument (on p. 5 of their commentary) seem to
be problematic.
The  second  issue  is  about  whether  the
sense of experiential ownership, as a phenom-
enal state,  is  eligible to serve as a bearer of
IEM.2 Haug and Jung insist  that  self-ascrip-
tions  relevant  to  IEM  must  be  an  explicit
judgment (or belief) in an inference. However,
it is not obvious that this restriction is man-
datory. Given that my focus is on how to un-
derstand the sense  of  self-as-subject,  I  think
that what is crucial for IEM is that the self-
2 Note that, as I suggested in the target paper (Liang this collection,
p. 6), the fact of experiential ownership and the sense of experiential
ownership are not numerically different states or events that can be
detached from a phenomenal state.  Rather,  they are  two ways of
characterizing the who-component of that state.
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ascriptions  are  justified  on  first-personal
grounds,  e.g.,  introspection,  somatosensation,
proprioception, etc. (cf. footnote 19 of the tar-
get paper). As the examiners of FB said: “The
patient was blindfolded and instructed to say
‘yes’ when she felt a touch and ‘no’ when she
did not feel any touch” (Bottini et al. 2002, p.
251). When FB said “yes” based on her sense
of  experiential  ownership,  there is  no  reason
why this  response  shouldn’t  count  as  a  self-
ascription.  If  we  wish,  we  can  reconstruct
FB’s response in propositional form: I am mis-
taken in  reporting  “yes”  during  the  test  (ii)
because, although I do know of someone that
feels the sensations (via first-personal access),
I  am  mistaken  in  thinking  about  who  that
person is. This seems to be a clear threat to
IEM.
Also, it is worth pointing out that not all
defenders  of  IEM  think  that  self-ascriptions
must  explicitly  be  in  propositional  form.  Ac-
cording to what may be called the Pre-reflective
Account (Legrand 2006,  2007,  2010;  Gallagher
2012;  Zahavi 2005), at the pre-reflective level,
the sense of self-as-subject is a constitutive com-
ponent of the conscious state rather than an in-
tentional  object  of  consciousness.  This  phe-
nomenological structure makes the sense of self-
as-subject  identification-free  and  hence  enjoys
IEM:  when  I  am pre-reflectively  conscious  of
myself-as-subject,  I  cannot be  wrong  about
whether I am the subject of experiences. For the
proponent  of  this  account,  making  judgments
about one’s sense of self-as-subject would count
as  reflective rather than pre-reflective self-con-
sciousness,  and  hence  ceases  to  be  identifica-
tion-free (Gallagher 2012, pp. 207–209). Given
these considerations, I believe that the premises
of Haug and Jung’s argument for the ineligibil-
ity  of  IEM-P are  not  as  firm as  they  might
think.3
The  third  issue  is  whether  the  specific
case of somatoparaphrenia and the body swap
illusion that I discussed are genuine counter-
examples  to  IEM.  The  way  that  Haug  and
Jung oppose my counterexamples is related to
our  dispute  above  concerning  whether  IEM
3 I discuss the Pre-reflective Account in “Body ownership and experi-
ential ownership in the self-touching illusion” (Liang et al. 2015).
has to be in the form of judgment. Haug and
Jung  define  “judgment”  as  referring  to  a
whole inference and “belief” as the conclusion
of  an  inference.  They  then  use  their  defini-
tions to articulate a version of IEM and the
necessary conditions for falsifying it. I concede
that I don’t see why their account is obligat-
ory  for  investigating  the  connection  between
IEM and the sense of self-as-subject. IEM has
many varieties  (cf.  Liang this collection,  pp.
7–8 and footnote 17). In my paper (Liang this
collection, pp. 2 and 6), I did not claim that
the two counterexamples would undermine all
versions  of  IEM.  It  was  “experiential  im-
munity”  in  its de  re and  which-object forms
that came under my attack. According to ex-
periential  immunity,  when  I  am  aware  of  a
phenomenal  state  through  first-personal  ac-
cess,  I  cannot be wrong about whether  it  is
me who feels it. This variety of IEM focuses
on phenomenal states rather than judgments,
and a key feature is that it is relative to first-
personal access, such as introspection, somato-
sensation, and proprioception. This feature ac-
commodates  a  widely  accepted  view  that
whether a self-ascription enjoys IEM depends
on its grounds (Pryor 1999; Coliva 2006). The
feature,  however,  is  omitted  from Haug  and
Jung’s account, which indicates that their ver-
sion of IEM is different from my target.
Haug and Jung argue that FB’s case is
not a genuine counterexample because she did
not judge “I am being touched on my hand”,
and hence the necessary conditions for falsify-
ing their  version  of  IEM are  not  met.  How-
ever, the perplexity of this case is not why FB
felt nothing when she expected that she would
be  touched,  but  why she  felt  the  sensations
when  she  expected  that  her  niece  would  be
touched.  So,  when  FB  reported  feeling  the
sensation in test (ii),  a more appropriate re-
construction of FB’s self-ascription would be:
“I am being touched on my niece’s hand.” She
was  wrong  because  in  fact  it  was  her  own
hand being touched by the researcher, not her
niece’s hand.  Then,  my interpretation in the
paper  suggested  that,  using  Haug &  Jung’s
formulation,  “the  only  reason  why  she  was
wrong was because she misidentified her own
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sensations  with  someone  else’s”  (this collec-
tion, p. 9). This provides a falsification of ex-
periential immunity.
Regarding the case of the body swap illu-
sion, Haug and Jung argue that this is simply
a case of mispredication. Instead of adding in
more conceptual analyses to compete for the
best interpretation of the study by Petkova &
Ehrsson (2008), I will briefly describe a set of
new experiments  that  combine  the  RHI  and
the  body  swap  illusion.  They  explicitly  ad-
dress the Wittgenstein Question and measure
the sense of experiential ownership. Before do-
ing so, let me reply to the last issue raised by
Haug and Jung.
The last  issue concerns whether IEM is
merely  a  trivial  property.  Here,  I  will  limit
myself to one remark. Haug and Jung consider
IEM as purely a linguistic rule regarding how
to  use  the  first-person  pronoun.  Although
many philosophers share this view, the goal of
my paper was not to attack a linguistic rule.
The opponents that I have in mind are those
who  try  to  use  IEM to  distinguish  between
the  sense  of  self-as-object  and  the  sense  of
self-as-subject. For these philosophers, IEM is
not trivial  at  all.  It  matters  to them and it
matters to me if it turns out that the sense of
self-as-subject really is fundamentally different
from the sense of self-as-object. Because if the
answer is yes, it would be very significant to
consider whether the necessary and sufficient
conditions  for  these  two  types  of  self-con-
sciousness are distinct, and whether they are
generated by different (though partially over-
lapping) neural mechanisms.
3 The self-touching illusion
At  the  end  of  my  target  paper  I  suggested
that the next step for the investigation of the
sense of self-as-subject would be to study the
various conditions where one can pursue the
Wittgenstein  Question.  I  recently  designed a
set of experiments that allow us make exactly
this  step.  The subject  wore  a  head-mounted
display (HMD) connected to a stereo camera
positioned on the experimenter’s head. Sitting
face  to  face,  they  used  their  right  hand  to
hold a paintbrush,  and brushed each other’s
left hand (figure  1).4 Through the HMD, the
subject adopted the experimenter’s 1PP as if
it was his/her own 1PP. In Experiment 1, the
participant  watched  from  the  adopted  3PP
(180°)  the  front  side  of  his/her  own  virtual
body, including not only the torso, legs, and
face, but also his/her own right hand holding
a paintbrush (figure  2). In Experiment 2, the
participant  watched  from  the  adopted  3PP
(180°)  the  front  side  of  his/her  own  virtual
body, including the torso and legs, but not the
face. The participant also saw his/her own left
hand being touched by a paintbrush held by
the experimenter’s hand (figure 3). Compared
with  the  asynchronous  condition,  the  syn-
chronous full-body condition generated a “self-
touching  illusion”:  the  subject  felt  “I  was
brushing my own hand!”5
Two  “Wittgenstein  Questions”  in  the
questionnaires  were  designed  specifically  to
measure the participants’ sense of experiential
ownership: “It was me who felt being brushed,
not someone else” (WQ1), and “The one who
felt being brushed was not me” (WQ2). Notice
that these two statements are directly opposed
to each other. In addition, they are not about
the sense of body ownership, but about  who
felt the tactile sensations caused by brushing.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the participants were
touched by a paintbrush, so they were indeed
the subjects  of  those tactile  sensations.  This
fixed the  fact  of their experiential ownership.
The  task  was  to  examine  whether  this  fact
was correctly represented by their sense of ex-
periential  ownership.  Focusing  on  the  syn-
4 The experiments and data presented here are part of a bigger pro-
ject;  cf.  “Body  ownership  and  experiential  ownership  in  the  self-
touching illusion” (Liang et al. 2015). Four students conducted the
experiments under my supervision: Si-Yan Chang, Wen-Yeo Chen,
Hsu-Chia Huang, Yen-Tung Lee.
5 The self-touching illusion was measured by two questionnaire state-
ments: “It felt as if I was brushing my own hand” (S1), and “The
one whom I brushed was me, not someone else” (S2). A Likert scale
from “strongly disagree” (-3) to “strongly agree” (+3) was used for
the questionnaires. In both Experiment 1 (sync. n=38, async. n=35)
and Experiment 2 (sync. n=28, async. n=14), the statistics showed
significant  differences  between  the  synchronous  and  asynchronous
conditions  (Exp.  1,  S1:  p<0.0010,  S2:  p<0.0010;  Exp.  2,  S1:
p<0.0010,  S2:  p=0.0003;  one-tailed  t-test).  The  measurements  of
skin conductance responses (Exp. 1, sync. n=15, async. n=15; Exp.
2, sync. n=13; async. n=13) showed the same differences (Exp. 1,
p=0.0080; Exp. 2, p=0.0473; one-tailed t-test). This provided object-
ive support for the questionnaire data. 
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chronous  conditions,  the  average  scores  on
WQ1 were 1.58 and 1.04 in Experiments 1 and
2 respectively, and the average scores on WQ2
were -1.03 and -0.50 in Experiments 1 and 2
respectively.
Suppose that the participants understood
WQ1 as addressing  themselves.  That is,  from
their subjective point of view: it was  me who
felt the brushing. Then, according to IEM, no
participants  would  commit  mistakes  regarding
their sense of experiential ownership. One would
expect  that  most  participants  would  answer
“strongly agree” (+3) or at least “agree” (+2)
on  WQ1.  But  that  is  not  the  case.  In  fact,
13.2% of participants in the synchronous condi-
tions  of  Experiments  1  and  2  disagreed  with
WQ1 (i.e., they answered either -1, -2, or -3),
and the average scores of WQ1 reported above
were  much  lower  than  this  interpretation  re-
quires.  I  discuss  other  possible  interpretations
elsewhere and argue that neither of them can
support  IEM.6 Based on the data,  it  is  more
plausible  that  at  least  some  participants  in
these  experiments  were  uncertain  and  hence
prone  to  error  about  whether  they  were  the
subjects of the tactile sensations that they actu-
ally felt. That is, the fact of having tactile sen-
sations does not guarantee that the participants
will necessarily have the  sense that “I am the
one who felt them.”7 Overall, the data provide
empirical evidence for the possibility that one’s
sense of experiential ownership can misrepresent
the  relevant  fact  of  experiential  ownership.
Hence, IEM could potentially be falsified.
6 Cf.  “Body  ownership  and  experiential  ownership  in  the  self-
touching  illusion”  (Liang et  al.  2015).  Briefly,  (i)  suppose  for
some  reason  that  the  participants  understood  WQ1 to  be  ad-
dressing someone else. That is, in their subjective experiences, it
was  not me who felt the brushing. Then, according to IEM, one
would expect that most participants would answer “strongly dis-
agree” (-3) or at least “disagree” (-2) on WQ1. But this is  not
the case either. This time, the average scores of WQ1 were too
high to fit this interpretation. (ii) Suppose that the participants
did not all understand WQ1 in the same way: some took it as ad-
dressing themselves, but others as addressing someone else. Then,
assuming IEM holds, one would expect the participants to answer
either +3 (or at least +2) or -3 (or at least -2). But, again, that
is not the case. Many participants answered “slightly disagree” (-
1), “not sure” (0), or “slightly agree” (+1). In fact, the standard
deviation in each experiment is large (Exp. 1, SD=1.5001; Exp.
2,  SD=1.5512),  suggesting  that  the  participants’  responses  to
WQ1 varied widely.
7 In addition to WQ1, we also presented WQ2 (“The one who felt be-
ing brushed was not me”) in the questionnaires. The direct contrast
between WQ2 and WQ1 was so obvious that, even if the participants
felt uncertain about WQ1, the contrast can still be easily recognized.
So, if IEM holds, one could reasonably expect that participants’ re-
sponses would manifest a strong “negative correlation” between WQ1
and WQ2.  For  example,  if  a  subject  answers  +3  to  WQ1,  then
he/she would likely answer -3 (or at least -2) to WQ2, etc. However,
we only observed a weak negative correlation between these two sets
of results (coefficient R=-0.3278).
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Figure 1: Experimental set-up.
Figure 2: Subjects’ view via the HMD in Experiment 1.
Figure 3: Subjects’ view via the HMD in Experiment 2.
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4 Conclusion
The defenders of IEM will try to find ways to
interpret  these  data  differently.  It  would  not
surprise me if what these data mean continues
to be controversial. However, I hope that exper-
iments like these and the discussions in the tar-
get paper will at least convince many research-
ers that sometimes it does make sense to ask
Wittgenstein  Questions  (like  WQ1  and  WQ2
above).  Both  the  sense  of  self-as-subject  and
IEM are open to empirical as well as philosoph-
ical investigation.
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